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INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the trajectory of the development of the 
Mexican left-wing Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in the period 1996-2006. 
There are three main reasons for focussing on this period. The first is that the PRD´s 
origins are already very well documented in the literature on the subject (Bruhn 1996, 
Borjas 2003), hence to study the early years of the party would involved some repetition. 
The second reason is that since 1996, the Mexican transition to democracy has picked-up 
pace. The PRD, which struggled for the democratisation of Mexico, has had to reposition 
itself on the political stage in recent times. The third reason is that during the period from 
1990 onwards, most of the countries in Latin America have leaned politically to the Left, 
while Mexico is still governed by a conservative party. The study will examine the nature 
of left-wing politics in Mexico, its internal and external adversaries, and the factors 
contributing to the persistence of conservative rule. 
 
In terms of economic development, Mexico is very similar to other Latin American 
countries. In many countries of the region the import substitution industrialization phase 
ended in crisis. Free-market economics were implemented. These economic measures 
became crucial for Mexico in the 1988 election, in which ex-PRI member Cuauhtémoc 
Cárdenas competed in the presidential election with PRI candidate Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari. Huge electoral fraud in 1988 united the oppositional groups under one party, the 
PRD. The Salinas’ administration implemented a neoliberal program that caused the 
Tequila Crisis. 
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The failure of neoliberal policies in Latin America is often interpreted as a key factor to 
understand the turn to the left in the region. However, in Mexico this did not occur. Thus, 
the first chapter of this essay is dedicated to an analysis of the socio-economic factors at 
work in the country and some of the key features that can be indentified regarding the 
PRD´s electoral results. Apart from socio-economic factors, the PRD´s electoral 
campaign will also be analysed. One of the indicators of the weakness of the PRD is its 
lack of national infrastructure.  
 
The second chapter of this study is dedicated to this issue of institutionalisation. The 
analysis will explore the theoretical perspectives related to institutionalisation to 
understand more clearly why it is such an important factor for a political party, 
particularly the PRD. There are four main categories associated with institutionalisation. 
Three of them are covered in the second chapter. The fourth one, which refers to the 
‘systemness’ understood as an increasing of the scope and density of the interactions that 
constitute the party as an organization, is discussed in the third chapter.  
 
The third chapter examines the PRD´s development and the party´s internal struggles. 
The scope is limited to the internal election of the president of the party, national 
congresses, and the arguments between leaders. The attempt is to prove that many of the 
problems related to the party inability to win a federal election derive from its internal 
weaknesses.  
 
 4
The study draws on existing literature on the subject, using also the Mexican press, and 
interviews with Kathleen Bruhn, Gerado Fernández Noroña and Francisco Reveles 
Vázquez.  
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DID MEXICO TURN LEFT? THE ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE OF THE 
PRD DURING THE PERIOD 1997 - 2006 
 
In 2006 everything worked well for the presidential candidate of the PRD, Andrés 
Manuel López Obrador, until election day. On 2 July 2006, the Mexican electorate chose, 
by a very narrow margin of votes, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa from the conservative 
National Action Party (PAN) for president. Jorge Castañeda states that the turn to the left 
on the political stage in Latin America is a consequence of the process of democratisation 
combined with the social, demographic and ethnic configuration of the region (Castañeda 
2006). The democratisation process ended successfully in Mexico in 2000 with the 
victory of PAN’s candidate Vincente Fox in the presidential election. For the first time in 
71 years of Mexican history the representative of the hegemonic party, the PRI, lost. The 
changes had emerged even earlier in 1997, when the opposition won the election to the 
Chamber of Deputies. The good performance of the PAN and the PRD was possible 
thanks to the electoral reforms of the 1990s. Thus, Mexico fulfils the conditions required 
to be described as a delegative democracy (O’Donnell: 1994).  
 
Regarding socio-economic indicators Mexico is comparable to other Latin American 
countries, which are governed by the Left. The level of the poverty headcount ratio at 
national poverty line in Mexico is very similar to Brazil and Chile (see Table.1.1). In the 
case of inequality measured by the Gini coefficient, Mexico is more equal than other 
countries of the region with the exception of Uruguay. Thus, why did Mexico not turn 
left?  
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Table 1.1 Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line in five Latin American 
countries ruled by the Left 
   
Brazil (2003) 22 
Chile (1998) 17 
Ecuador (1998) 46 
Mexico (2004) 18 
Peru (2004) 53 
Source: World Bank Indicators 2007/8 
 
Table 1.2 Inequality measured by Gini coefficient in seven Latin American countries 
ruled by the Left  
 
 Gini index* 
Bolivia 60.1 
Brazil 57.0 
Chile 54.9 
Ecuador 53.6 
Mexico 46.1 
Uruguay 44.9 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 48.2 
* A value of 0 represents absolute equality, and a value of 100 absolute inequality. 
Source: World Bank. 2007 World Development Indicators 2007. CD-ROM. Washington, D.C. 
 
In fact Mexico did turn to the Left, but not enough - the Left in Mexico won neither 
presidential elections nor parliamentary elections in 2006, although the PRD did receive 
the highest number of votes in its 18 year history. Table 1.3 contains the data related to 
the PRD electoral results for the Chamber of Deputies in the period 1997 – 2006. In 1997 
the PRD became for the first time the second biggest party in the Chamber of Deputies.  
Table 1.3 The PRD in the elections to the Chamber of Deputies in 1997 - 2006 
District List TotalParty/Coalition Year Votes % 
Seats 
Votes % 
Seats Seats
PRD 1997 7,436,466 25.0 70 7,519,914 25.0 55 125
Aliance for Mexico (PRD, PT, PAS, C, PSN) 2000 6,942,844 18.7 26 6,984,126 18.7 40 66 
PRD 2003 4,694,365 17.6 55 4,707,009 17.6 41 96 
Coalition for the Good of All  (PRD, PT, C) 2006 11,941,842 29.0 98 12,013,364 29.0 60 158
Source: http://www.electionresources.org 
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The second time this happened was in 2006. However, in 2006 the PRD received almost 
4 500 000 more votes than in 1997, which is a 37% difference. The data related to the 
presidential election illustrates the increase of the support to the party even better. López 
Obrador received almost 2,5 times more votes than Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas six years 
earlier. Thus, even though, Mexico is not ruled by the Left there is an evidence of the 
shift to more leftist positions in the political preferences.    
Table 1.4 The presidential candidates of the PRD in years 2000 and 2006 
Candidate Votes  % 
 Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano - Alliance for Mexico (PRD, PT, PAS, C, PSN)    6,256,780  16.6 
 Andrés Manuel López Obrador - Coalition for Good of All (PRD, PT, C)    14,683,096  35.3 
Source: http://www.electionresources.org 
A closer look at the electoral data and the levels of well-being sheds light on the PRD’s 
performance in particular Mexican states. Table 1.5 combines the level of well-being in 
1995 and the state electoral outcome for the PRD in the period 1997-2006 in the plurality 
elections. The highlighted rows represent the states in which the PRD won 30% of the 
votes in a minimum of two electoral races. The numbers prove that the PRD is strong in 
the region of the highest level of well-being, which includes the Federal District as well 
as some states with very low and medium levels of well-being. Hence, the PRD receives 
votes in very diversified areas, like the rural states, for example: Guerrero, Michoacan, or 
Oaxaca, and the urban ones, like in the case of the Federal District. The party is much 
stronger in southern Mexico, than in the north, which in recent years became dominated 
by PAN. While it is possible to construct an analogy between the poor south and better 
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Table 1.5 The electoral outcome of the PRD in the plurality elections to the Chamber of Deputies in the period 1997 – 2006 at 
the state level combined with the level of well-being  
 
STATE 
LEVEL 
OF WELL 
BEING IN 
1995* PRD 1997 TOTAL 
PERCENTAGE 
OF VOTES IN 
1997 
ALIANCE 
POR 
MEXICO TOTAL 
PERCENTAGE 
OF VOTES IN 
2000 PRD 2003 TOTAL 
PERCENTAGE 
OF VOTES IN 
2003 
COALITON 
FOR THE 
GOOD OF 
ALL TOTAL 
PERCENTAGE 
OF VOTES IN 
2006  
AGUASCALIENTES 2 37183 293896 13% 30533 370473 8% 17788 261479 7% 70480 401591 18% 
BAJA CALIFORNIA 2 79231 605280 13% 76543 844784 9% 34734 548782 6% 179192 925645 19% 
BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR Nd 14121 117073 12% 63291 163195 39% 45993 106435 43% 75712 175287 43% 
CAMPECHE 6 75354 216173 35% 38991 255108 15% 6303 263171 2% 62542 300255 21% 
COAHUILA 2 76971 558586 14% 75757 806883 9% 27040 427650 6% 165111 923039 18% 
COLIMA 4 38429 198844 19% 27303 216376 13% 24480 200826 12% 32278 251071 13% 
CHIAPAS 7 182478 649807 28% 276622 1068899 26% 147355 731588 20% 461974 1244448 37% 
CHIHUAHUA 2 91170 911602 10% 83187 1119844 7% 47134 757095 6% 153074 1147011 13% 
DISTRITO FEDERAL 1 1750723 3947800 44% 1315932 4384072 30% 1259021 2941691 43% 2468718 4799053 51% 
DURANGO 4 42703 406668 11% 62547 498677 13% 14538 364862 4% 95754 564974 17% 
GUANAJUATO 7 200982 1596451 13% 145941 1839498 8% 183953 1504423 12% 256934 1939111 13% 
GUERRERO 6 285914 691890 41% 348307 927982 38% 240713 630348 38% 452001 972873 46% 
HIDALGO 4 168222 651550 26% 151916 810895 19% 93043 561509 17% 296838 932670 32% 
JALISCO 2 240492 2103113 11% 205551 2587748 8% 154254 2312424 7% 364345 2872922 13% 
MEXICO 5 1312142 3941992 33% 1030512 5084043 20% 699469 2982049 23% 2031389 5633607 36% 
MICHOACAN 4 432249 1101338 39% 549252 1445546 38% 291798 829471 35% 566088 1472812 38% 
MORELOS Nd 176403 451561 39% 123340 630616 20% 102687 514213 20% 221066 698737 32% 
NAYARIT 4 56874 280614 20% 65747 351619 19% 23621 227714 10% 132511 357814 37% 
NUEVO LEON 2 39421 1376725 3% 103539 1518134 7% 30172 1424183 2% 164942 1753155 9% 
OAXACA 7 250014 846431 30% 276390 1120855 25% 144078 817409 18% 554235 1326174 42% 
PUEBLA 6 219953 1262350 17% 217612 1706522 13% 87839 1155894 8% 492516 1966353 25% 
QUERETARO 4 42767 471793 9% 41660 554439 8% 39859 516922 8% 114442 649011 18% 
QUINTANA ROO 3 39639 173550 23% 57734 282237 20% 14554 186987 8% 112352 375027 30% 
SAN LUIS POTOSI 6 75004 724918 10% 76659 824343 9% 53676 638888 8% 147088 942785 16% 
SINALOA 2 176251 793072 22% 155310 959370 16% 81200 650372 12% 169841 966614 18% 
SONORA 2 198993 740363 27% 137823 865681 16% 87679 782141 11% 141155 922687 15% 
TABASCO 6 216093 545960 40% 239521 672376 36% 180039 489653 37% 464004 902913 51% 
TAMAULIPAS 2 213875 820436 26% 96583 1078902 9% 60694 795878 8% 242175 1187934 20% 
TLAXCALA 4 57894 250286 23% 92975 346165 27% 67788 210461 32% 142496 407109 35% 
VERACRUZ 6 550470 2111721 26% 582938 2637188 22% 229299 1906348 12% 834026 2886033 29% 
YUCATAN 4 35996 501055 7% 28186 691086 4% 27599 524468 5% 93697 779273 12% 
ZACATECAS 4 58455 429013 14% 164642 501837 33% 175965 386311 46% 182866 517210 35% 
NACIONAL   7436466 29771911 25% 6942844 37165393 19% 4694365 26651645 18% 11941842 41195198 29% 
*Scale 1 – very low level of well-being, 7 – very high level of well-being 
Source: Electoral data: IFE, www.ife.org.mx; Well-Being data: INEGI, 1996, Sistema Nacional Estadístico y de Infromación Geográfica – www.inegi.gob.mx
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developed north, the pattern of electoral choice is not solely determined by the economic 
dimension.  
 
The issue of Mexico’s electoral choices is more complex due to the legacy of the PRI. 
The inheritance after the hegemonic party rule determines that the PRD and the PAN 
confront the PRI at the state level much more often than they confront each other 
(Lawson, McCann, 2003: 65). Corporatism is still present in Mexico. The most important 
unions are controlled by the PRI. Even though the union’s bargaining power was 
weakened by the process of privatisation and opening up of the economy, they are still 
influential in strategic industries, amongst them the oil industry. Hence, apart from the 
well-established political structures of the PRI, such a social composition determines that 
the Left lacks its typical power base. The PRI is also influential in the poorest areas of 
Mexico. López Obrador pointed out that about 55% of the poorest Mexicans voted for the 
PRI due to clientelism (Proceso  07 Sep 1997: 20). The socio-economic explanation 
proposed by Castañeda might be used to partly explain the electoral growth of the PRD 
(see table 1.4), but it is at the same time too limited.  
 
Kathleen Bruhn states that if there was only one dimension of politics then such an 
assumption would be true, but there are also many other dimensions like: social, 
religious, cultural etc (2008). She adds that Mexican society is much more conservative 
than that of most Latin American countries and is particularly sensitive to violence which 
is associated with the experiences of the Mexican Revolution. Therefore the party is often 
portrayed as violent in the media, which is one reason the PRD cannot win enough 
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support to rule the country. For example, in 1994, the rise of the Zapatista Army of 
National Liberation (EZLN) brought many concerns in public opinion about the left. 
Three years later, the PRD distanced itself from the EZLN and proposed a more centrist 
agenda.  
 
The party likewise became more flexible by incorporating well-known external 
candidates, mainly from the PRI, a move that was positively perceived by the voters 
(Reyes García 2001 : 99-100). This practice provoked many controversies within the 
PRD. On the one hand, it meant that the PRD experienced higher number of victories at a 
local and federal level, whilst on the other hand there was the question of the loyalty of 
the new members, who had drifted to the party due to the weakening of the PRI, as well 
as fostering clientelism.  
 
The situation of the parties changed in terms of their finances and media opening. The 
1996 electoral reform made new funding available, which allowed the PRD to organize 
its campaign and to create the Sun Brigades (Bruhn 1999: 95). There were three axes of 
the campaign in 1997: advertisement on radio and television, the campaign of each 
candidate, and the door-to-door campaigning of 63 000 members of the Sun Brigades 
(Proceso  1 June 1997: 12). Some of the members were volunteers, but many of them 
were paid 300 pesos. The Sun Brigades incorporated a three step strategy.  The first visit 
was called the PRD asks, the second the PRD proposes, the third the PRD asks for a vote. 
The main strategist of the Sun Brigades was Rafael Landerreche Gómez Morín, a 
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grandson of the founder of the PAN. López Obrador, who was at the time the president of 
the PRD, coordinated the work.  
 
The Sun Brigades were the instrument for the lack of the national structures of the party 
(Proceso  20 July 1997: 20). Their work was crucial for the triumph in the first elections 
for Mayor in Mexico, an electoral race won by Cárdenas. The PRD won a bastion of 
support in the most densely populated of area in Mexico where 11,2% of all registered 
voters lived (Bruhn 1999: 92). Hence, victory for the leader of the PRD reflected on the 
good performance of his party. The triumph in the Federal District gave the PRD a real 
opportunity to govern. During the campaign, Cárdenas promised to solve the problems of 
Mexico City and initiate new policies regarding children, elderly people, single mothers, 
and to fight against insecurity and corruption. The survey conducted by the Universidad 
de Guadalajara after half a year of the Cárdenas administration showed that 31,2% people 
described the new administration as bad, 58,4% stated that nothing had changed, and 
8,2% were very content (Proceso  31 May 1998: 6-11). The same poll indicated that 
Cárdenas was likely to win the presidential election in 2000.  
 
However, until 2000, the perception of his record in governing Mexico City became 
worse. In spite of the fact that Cárdenas’ chances to play important role in the presidential 
election were low, he was chosen as the PRD´s candidate. According to Greene, such a 
selection was dictated by the moral authority of the PRD leader rather than his electoral 
popularity (Greene 2007: 229). Bruhn pointed out three other key factors: the failure to 
construct an opposition alliance between the PRD and PAN due to the distrust between 
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the parties, the internal structure of the PRD, which was cemented by the authority of 
Cárdenas, and Mexican electoral law, which discouraged the resignation of the registered 
candidates by conditioning the party funding on the electoral results (Bruhn 2004: 133).  
 
Cárdenas’ campaign style was old-fashioned. While the PRD candidate was travelling 
around Mexico, addressing his left-wing agenda to the crowds in the plazas, Fox 
conducted a well-equipped media campaign  consisting of 65 well targeted clips (Greene 
2007: 239). The intensive media campaign was carried out through the creation of the 
Friends of Fox movement. There is no doubt that the personal charisma of Fox was 
another important indicator for the phenomenon called “Factor Fox”. The elections had a 
plebiscitary character. The strategy of the Fox camp was to convince people that their 
candidate represented a change and the promise of democracy. However, the success of 
that electoral tactic was partly achieved thanks to the errors made by PRD. The PRD 
strategy attempted to polarize the electorate around the economic issues by attempting to 
attribute the evils of Neoliberalism to the PAN and the PRI, and the more nationalist 
economic program to Cárdenas. Thus, according to Palma Esperanza, the choice was 
between the real change, which should have been identified with Cárdenas, and the same 
old politics, which should have been identified with Labastida and Fox (Cotidiano 
March/April 2001: 106). The author claims that such a discourse appeared to be neither 
credible nor clear. The shift to a more leftist stance appealed primarily to the party’s core 
voters (Greene 2007: 237). In consequence, it was easier for the PAN to promote the idea 
of the valid vote, which was seen to be a vote for Fox. Whereas the 2000 election was a 
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disaster for Cárdenas, the star of López Obrador was beginning to shine. López Obrador 
was elected mayor of Mexico City.  
 
In 2003 Mexican society appeared to be disillusioned. The change that had been 
promised did not occur and democracy did not resolve the problems of the citizens.  
According to the survey conducted by Covaburrias y Asociados S.C., 52% of the 
interviewees did not see or hear any publicity related to the campaign (Proceso  29 Junio 
2003: 22). Abstention reached 58% (Camp 2006: 3). The new president of the PRD, 
Rosario Robles, promised to gain 20% of the votes. In May 2003, two newspapers, 
Reforma and El Universal, published the polls, which stated that López Obrador enjoyed 
a 83% and 85% level of the endorsement as mayor of Mexico City (Milenio12 May 
2003: 14). Thus the ambition of the PRD and the numbers proposed were optimistic. In 
the election the PRD attracted mainly self-declared leftist voters (Camp 2006: 7). 
Nevertheless, the PRD won 96 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.  The electoral result 
seemed to be a victory. In reality the electoral outcome did become a problem for Robles, 
because it meant that the PRD obtained 18,8% of the vote. Hence, Robles had to resign. 
A few days after the election, Cárdenas reflected his preoccupation about the fall of the 
voting and lack of the PRD presence in whole Mexico (La Jornada 09 July 2003: 14).  At 
this stage, Cárdenas still did not discount the possibility of his standing in the 2006 
elections (Milenio 10 Feb 2003: 34).  
 
In the end it was López Obrador who was nominated as the presidential candidate by the 
PRD in 2005. His popularity derived from the social policies implemented in the Federal 
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District, which were related mainly to the elderly and poor people. On 11 August 2005 
López Obrador began his route around Mexico. The idea was to build a broad citizens’ 
movement (López Obrador 2007: 184). It was again the means by which to ensure an 
advantageous lack of party regional structures. In March 2005 there were 970 local 
communities; their number increased up to 4000 before the election (Grayson 2007: 239). 
The main campaign began in January. The election slogan was “The Good of All, Above 
All the Poor.” Thus the party attempted once again to attract the poorer strata of the 
society, by highlighting evils of Neoliberalism. The alleviation of poverty and the 
implementation of social policies were the central issues of the PRD campaign.  López 
Obrador, like Cárdenas six years earlier, travelled around Mexico. In contrary to the 2000 
the presidential campaign, López Obrador was hardly trying to position his agenda in the 
centre (Bruhn 2006: 19). According to the surveys conducted by the eight main 
companies, López Obrador was approximately 8 points ahead of his closest competitor in 
January and February (Nexos May 2006: 29). The first time the new leader in the 
presidential race was indicated was in March, by the polls made by GEA-ISA and Arcorp 
(Nexos May 2006: 29). In March López Obrador reacted with anger to president Fox´s 
interference in the campaign. At the rally he told the president to “shut up chachalaca”, 
chachalaca being a rare bird known for chattering endlessly (New York Times 7 April 
2006). A few days later the PAN transmitted its new electoral advertisement, which 
showed first the Venezuelan president, Chavez, who is known for his antipathy to Fox, 
and later López Obrador.  
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The negative campaign began. The PAN decided to pull negative strings by calling López 
Obrador a danger for Mexico, a liar, and a populist similar to Hugo Chavez, whose 
politics would bring crisis and debts. López Obrador did not respond immediately to 
these insinuations. In the midst of the media attack López Obrador decided to miss the 
first television debate, which took place in April, and as a result of this, lost the lead 
(Klesner 2007: 11). He claims that the first debate was a trap, that it was known from the 
beginning that he would lose it (López Obrador 2007: 210). Cálderon was the winner of 
the first debate. From then on his camp worked on promoting more a positive image. He 
was introduced as a “Jobs President” (Grayson 2007: 251-252).  
 
López Obrador attacked Cálderon in the second debate in June. He accused the PAN 
candidate of helping his brother-in-law’s software company win government contracts. 
The PRD camp prepared an advertisement to illustrate this. Nonetheless, it was too late. 
Cálderon was very close. Ten days before the election day most of the surveys gave a 3% 
advantage to López Obrador. Then, according to the PRD candidate, the ‘mafia’, as 
López Obrador chose to call Fox, Salinas, Elba Esther Gordillo, Cálderon and others, 
decided to orchestrate an electoral fraud (López Obrador 2007: 213). Hence, the speaker 
of the PRD, Gerardo Fernández Noroña, when asked why Mexico did not turn to the left, 
responded that actually it did, but the PRD was robbed of the election (Fernández Noroña 
2008).  On the election day, the president of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), Luis 
Carlos Ugalde, announced that the winner of the contest would be announced during the 
following couple of days, because the result was so close. On 6 July the IFE declared that 
Cálderon had won.  
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This alleged electoral fraud became legendary in Mexico. The PRD people point out that 
it was a right-wing “mafia”; others accuse the U.S. or even Interpol. Luis Mandoki 
directed a movie called “Fraude Mexico 2006” in which the conspiracy is presented as an 
attack by the entrepreneurs and political clique, who defend their business against the 
national leader and the nation. There are many doubts related to the 2006 presidential 
elections. There were many errors and irregularities. For example, all together there were 
on the one hand 800 000 excessive ballots, and on the other hand 716 000 ballots were 
missing (Mandoki 2007). This means that more than 1,5 million votes were unaccounted 
for in the election. The PRD appealed to the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPJF). López 
Obrador called a rally in Zócalo in Mexico City and asked followers to block the city 
until the final verdict of the TEPJF. The PRD stated that the votes were badly counted 
and that president and the business organizations interfered in the campaign, an 
intervention prohibited by law. Finally, 9% of the total votes were recounted. On 5 
September 2006 the TEPJF announced that there were irregularities, however, they were 
not grave enough to question the electoral outcome. Cálderon won by 233 831 votes, or 
0.56%. The electoral archives do not prove that there was any fraud, but nor do they 
prove that Cálderon won objectively (Crespo 2008: 102).  
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MEANING OF INSTITUTIONALISATION 
 
The main aim of a political party in a democratic system is to gain power by winning 
elections. The PRD reached this objective in recent years at a municipal and 
governmental level. In 2003 the party ruled 14,6% of the city councils (Borjas 2005: 
445), and six states:  Baja California Sur, Zacatecas, Michoacán, Federal District, 
Tlaxcala, Chiapas – in total governing 23 961 318 Mexicans (Sánchez 2005a: 467).  As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, after the defeat of 2000 and the deterioration of his 
influence in the party, Cárdenas realized that the lack of territorial structures lowered the 
odds to win the election. A lack of national infrastructure is one of the symptoms of weak 
institutionalisation. Hence, the problems related to the institutionalisation of the PRD can 
be seen as key to our understanding of why Mexico is not ruled by the Left.   
 
While the PRD grows at a regional level, it had been victory in the presidential election 
that prompted the creation of this party. In the presidential system, which is the case of 
Mexico, executive power is concentrated in the hands of the president. Therefore, to gain 
power in Mexico requires success in the presidential election. The PRD emerged as an 
alliance of the left-wing parties - the Mexican Communist Party (PCM), the Unified 
Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM), the Mexican Socialist Party (PMS), the Mexican 
Worker’s Party (PMT), and PRI dissidents. These conditions determined the 
organizational heterogeneity of the PRD. 
 
Panebianco stresses the importance of the origins of a party (1988: 50). The genetic 
model, as Panebianco calls the formative stage of the party development, determines the 
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organizational structure for a long period of time. Therefore, rather than considering the 
PRD as a left-wing party, it is more appropriate to consider it as a party of multiple left-
wing positions (Noroña 2008), a “coalition of separate political groupings” (Lawson 
1997: 25) or as a block of “intimate enemies and circumstantial friends” (Martínez 2005: 
155). This mosaic of political views remained on the political stage thanks to strong 
leadership, which in itself implied weak institutionalisation. Without Cárdenas, unity 
would be impossible (Sánchez 1999: 63).  
 
The leader and the collective identity associated with the party ideology are the most 
important elements in the formative phase of the party development (Panebianco 1988: 
53). Regarding its ideology, the PRD as a party, which embraced a broad spectrum of 
political orientations from social democracy to the radical left, had problems articulating 
clearly a programmatic unity. As a result, the party was built around common objectives 
like democratisation, victory in the presidential election, and a counter-neoliberal stance. 
Hence, it is often considered as the electoral party (Reveles 2004). The PRD is an 
electoral party because of its strong focus on the elections. This type of party tends to 
reduce ideological baggage, strengthen its top leadership, downgrade the role of the 
individual member, de-emphasise class divisions, and secure access to a variety of 
interests groups (Kirchheimer 1966: 190). Nevertheless, the PRD became an electoral 
party in 1997 because this was the year of its first significant electoral triumphs. Until 
1997 the PRD was purely an opposition party.  
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After the 2000 election, the PRD president, Amalia García, stated that the two central 
motivations that gave cohesion to the party – a desire to defeat the PRI and to elevate the 
charismatic figure of Cárdenas - were gone (Dialogo y Debate 2000: 50).  With its leader 
deeply wounded by the third electoral defeat, the PRD had to strengthen itself through 
internal reform. It was not the party’s first attempt. Even though the PRD reorganized 
itself and its main features many times, caudillismo and factionalism were deeply- rooted 
characteristics that remained (Sánchez 1999: 57). These two features are further 
symptoms of weak institutionalisation. The topic aroused concern between the scholars of 
the subject of PRD development (Reveles 2004, Vivero 2006). They highlight that the 
party neglected to develop rules and routine. Furthermore, to an extant this hybrid 
construction condemned the party to suffer permanent internal struggles, and also 
fostered corporatism and clientelism.  
 
Before moving forward in this investigation of the level of institutionalisation achieved 
by of the PRD it is worth delineating the concept itself. In general terms, 
institutionalisation is “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value 
and stability” (Huntington 1968: 12) or “the way the organization ‘solidifies’” 
(Panebianco 1988: 49). Institutionalisation can be related to the party system as well as to 
the party. Hence, there is a tendency to confuse party institutionalisation and the 
institutionalisation of the party system, which are not congenial concepts (Randall & 
Svåsand 2002: 6).  
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The notion is that the institutionalisation of a party contributes to the institutionalisation 
of a party system (Mainwaring & Torcal 2006: 205). However, Randall and Svåsand 
claim that there are cases, which do not follow this pattern. They point out that 
institutionalisation can be interfered with by conditions like unevenness. Randall and 
Svåsand write: “Extreme unevenness of party institutionalisation not only detracts from 
the competitiveness of the party system; it is also likely, though not bound, to mean that 
significant social sectors are excluded not only from power but from any meaningful 
party representation” (2002: 9). In this sense, the low level of institutionalisation of the 
PRD in the period 1988 until 1995 can be explained by the unevenness of the political 
system. In the first years, the PRD was repressed; the political system was closed and 
immobile.  
 
Institutionalisation of the party system was investigated by Mainwaring and Scully, who 
measured it by using four criteria: volatility of electoral choices, the depth of the party 
penetration of society, the legitimization of the political parties in the perception of 
citizens and organized interest groups as channels to propel candidates into power and the 
internal consolidation of the parties themselves (Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 5-34).  
 
Either the volatility of electoral behaviour or the party penetration of society had changed 
dramatically in Mexico since the 80s. The process of democratisation deteriorated the 
highly institutionalized system of hegemonic party rule in Mexico. The weakening of the 
PRI altered the balance on the political stage and created space for the PAN and the PRD 
to operate and gain support. This is the reason why democratisation brought 
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deinstitutionalisation. As Mainwaring states “high levels of institutionalisation may result 
from a stultified party system” (1999: 26). Thus deinstitutionalisation in the case of 
Mexico was positive in the sense that it facilitated a more diverse political landscape. 
 
 In this regard, the question of the thresholds of institutionalisation emerges. Is there any 
perfect point on the scale of institutionalisation? Mainwaring and Scully classified 
Venezuela as a stable. However, well-institutionalised political system of Venezuela 
collapsed and subsequently opened the way for populism. Hence, “an institutionalised 
party system per se, does not automatically deliver or even facilitate most outcomes that 
one hopes a democracy will produce” (Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 21). Thus 
institutionalisation has its own dynamics related to elements of political and economic 
development of the particular country.  
 
Mainwaring and Scully measure volatility of electoral choice in Pedersen’s index. 
According to their data, in the years 1981 – 1991 the Pedersen’s index for Mexico 
equalled 22,7 in the case of the elections to the Chamber of Deputies. The simplified 
calculation based on the data presented in the Table 2.1 show that the volatility of 
electoral choices is lower in years 1997-2006 and reached 10,1. This calculation was 
made by taking into consideration the results of the three main parties in four consecutive 
elections, whether they formed coalition or not. The index is equal to the sum of the net 
percentage of the gains and losses of the parties divided by two and divided by the 
number of electoral periods. In the case of the presidential elections the volatility is 19,6 
(Table 2.2).  
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Table 2.1 Mexican elections results to the Chamber of Deputies  1997 - 2006  
YEAR PAN PRI PRD 
1997  25.9 %  38.0%  25.0% 
2000  38.2 %  36.9 %  18.7 %
2003  30.7 %  40.8 %  17.6 %
2006  33.4 %  28.2 %  29.0 %
Source: Own evaluation based on the data from IFE 
Table 2.2 Mexican presidential elections 2000 and 2006 
YEAR PAN PRI PRD 
2000 42,5 36,1 16,6 
2006 35,9 22,2 35,3 
Source: Own evaluation based on the data from IFE 
The penetration of the society by the party is measured by three variables: longevity of 
the party existence, the difference between presidential and legislative voting, the control 
of the organized sectors.  
 
The PRD was established in 1989, and as such is the youngest of the three main parties in 
Mexico. 19 years in the history of the party is not a lot. The difference between the 
presidential voting and legislative voting patterns can be observed in the cases of the 
PAN in 2000 and the PRD in 2006. The control of the organized sectors is constrained 
for the PRD, which might be related to its age, internal complexity and the PRI legacy. It 
does not mean that the PRD has no ties with civil society and the independent unions.  
 
The third indicator in Mainwaring and Scilly’s categorization, which is the perspective of 
a party legitimization to control the power is debatable. Although the political parties are 
among the least trusted institutions in Mexico (Camp: 2006), they control the resources in 
the political system, such as funds and candidate selection (Langston 2007: 246). This 
 23
control consolidates the party system. In the case of the PRD, state funding is one of the 
reasons that cements the party structure (Semo 2003: 130). In the Mexican system, 90% 
of the party funds come from the budget. In Table 2.3 there are examples of the amounts 
in pesos that the parties received in election years.  
Table 2.3 Public funding of the parties in Mexico in selected years 
YEAR PAN PRI PRD 
1997 527 248 111 892 112 657 391 336 040 
2000 692 713 249 921 114 278 656 852 500 
2003 13 08 513 109 1 445 251 549 574 235 770 
2006 1 129 321 165 1 226 924 414 722 691 369 
 Source: IFE 
In the elections since 1997 until 2006, the three main political parties participated and 
currently there are no indicators that this will change.  
 
Party institutionalisation, which is the last element of the Mainwaring and Scully 
framework, deserves closer investigation. Huntington distinguishes four dimensions of 
institutionalisation: adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence (1968). According 
to this categorization, adaptability stands for the functional adaptation of a party over a 
period of time. There are three main components to evaluate adaptability. These are: the 
age of the party, shifts in leadership, and the shift from the oppositional role to a 
governmental one. The age of the PRD has already been discussed in relation to party 
penetration of society. The party survived its first significant shift in leadership when 
López Obrador took the place of Cárdenas as the presidential candidate. The shift from 
an oppositional role to a governmental one was achieved at the state and municipal level.  
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Complexity refers to the structure and sub-units of the party. The lack of local structures 
was already mentioned as a problem of the PRD. Dix points out, that personalism limits 
complexity (1992). He also states that while the authoritarian – populist parties passed 
away, there is also “counter evidence of an overall decline of party caudillos”, which can 
be exemplified by Cárdenas’ challenge to the PRI (Dix 1992: 498-499). Even though the 
PRD might be evaluated as a populist party, it would better match Dix’s category of 
democratic populism (1985: 29-52). Basing his argument on the examples of Democratic 
Action (AD) in Venezuela, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) in 
Peru, and the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) in Bolivia, Dix claims that 
democratic populist parties tend to institutionalise. While most of the countries in Latin 
America experienced periods of democracy in the twentieth century, Mexico did not. 
Thus, a low level of institutionalisation can be associated with the peculiarity of the 
Mexican political system after the Revolution  
 
The next category from Huntington’s framework is that of autonomy, which refers to a 
party’s independence from other social groupings. Janda points out that for example, the 
autonomy category is questionable if we follow the example of the Labour Party in the 
UK and its relation to the unions (Janda 1980: 19). Levitsky followed Janda and gave as 
an example the Peronist Party (PJ) in Argentina (1998). However, in both cases the trade 
unions, which constrained party autonomy were weakened by market friendly policies. 
The PRD autonomy is not limited. Coherence is the last variable in Huntington’s 
framework. It is associated with the internal consensus related to the functionality and 
procedures of the party itself (Huntington 1968). Penabianco stresses the importance of 
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autonomy and coherence He claims that institutionalisation can be measured on two 
scales: the degree of autonomy and degree of systemness. The former of these 
emphasizes the relationship of the party with the external environment, while the latter 
one is associated with the internal cohesion of the party (Panebianco 1988: 55). 
According to Penabianco, these dimensions are related in a way that “a low degree of 
systemness often implies little autonomy vis-à-vis the environment, and vice versa” 
(Panebianco 1988: 57). The autonomy factor coexists in Huntington’s and Panebianco’s 
categorization, while the notion of systemness is very similar to coherence combined 
with complexity. The factor of systemness will be further evaluated below, while a more 
detailed investigation regarding its extent will be presented in the next chapter.  
 
These two frameworks of Huntington and Panebianco were applied to investigate 
Western European parties, which developed in an environment of consolidated 
democracy. Until recently, Mexico did not really experience democracy. In terms of a 
political tradition it combined, as Carlos Fuentes stated, an authoritarian tradition and a 
revolutionary tradition. Thus, again the conditions of the political system limited the 
possible scope of institutionalisation.  
 
Mainwaring points out that many parties in the third way of democratisation had scant 
funds and the level of professionalism was low (1999: 37). Public financing guarantees 
the funding in case of Mexican parties.. However, the professionalisation of the party is 
often neglected. The PRD does not invest in the cadres in terms of development (Noroña 
2008).  
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Another problem is that as Mainwaring states in many cases of fluid systems politicians 
are not loyal to the party. In Mexico, many ex PRI members joined the PRD. In some 
cases it weakened the PRD even more by breaking its fragile cohesion. The situation is 
reminiscent of Dirk Tomsa’s example of the Golkar party in Indonesia, which did not 
have an organizational infrastructure then decided to accommodate the local leaders into 
the party. Tomsa writes: “These leaders then took over important dual functions: on the 
one hand they acted as brokers for the party, while on the other hand they remained 
patrons to their own clients in their old, established local network” (2008: 38). 
 
The good news is that the PRD is not an isolated example of a low level of 
institutionalisation. Low institutionalisation is actually quite common in Third World 
countries. In this context, the example of highly institutionalised Western European 
parties is rather untypical (Herbut: 2002: 65). Thus, institutionalisation should be rather 
understood as “the process by which the party becomes established in terms both of 
integrated patterns of behaviour and of attitudes, or culture” (Randall and Svåsand 2002: 
12). 
 
Randall and Svåsand question the assumption of the party institutionalisation in relation 
to the new democracies as well as its relation to the party system. They examined many 
obstacles, which constrained the development of the parties in the newly democratized 
countries. Their model identifies two general dimensions internal and external. Within 
each of these dimensions they distinguish two aspects: structural and attitudinal. The 
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framework looks as follows: internal/structural refers to systemness, internal/attitudinal 
refers to value infusion, external/structural refers to decisional autonomy, and external 
attitudinal refers to reification (see Table 2.4) 
Table 2.4 Dimensions of party institutionalisation 
 INTERNAL EXTERAL 
STRUCTURAL SYSTEMNESS DECISIONAL 
AUTONOMY 
ATTITUDINAL VALUE INFUSION REIFICATION 
 Source: Randall and Svåsand 
The internal/structural dimension depends on the ability to build the organization.  
Randall and Svåsand (2002) claim that ‘systemness’ is the increasing scope, density and 
routine of the interactions that constitute the party as an organization. Randall and 
Svåsand point out that party building in Third World democracies is not gradual as it is in 
Europe. In the case of the PRD the party emerged as a broad coalition in opposition to the 
hegemonic party rule and the dominant neoliberal economic model. In the first years of 
its existence, the PRD was oppressed. A few hundred militants were killed during the 
Salinas presidency. The party was living in a state of confrontation with the political 
system. In the 90s, the party moved to a more moderate stance, and opened negotiations 
with the government. In the period under consideration in this study, 1996 – 2006, the 
PRD showed some signs of institutionalisation. Until 1996, the financial resources 
available to the party were scant. There was no historical tradition on which to build a 
democratic left-wing party. Charismatic leadership and factionalism limited 
institutionalisation, as did clientelism. These obstacles were distinguished by Randall and 
Svåsand. Leadership and factionalism are the most striking features of the PRD. Thus the 
next chapter will be dedicated to them.  
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Value infusion refers to the internal culture of a party, which entails identification and 
commitment of the party members and the supporters. Levitsky, proved on the example 
of the Peronist Party (PJ) that “value infusion and routinization are distinct organizational 
phenomena that do not necessarily occur together”(1998: 82). The PJ is highly infused 
while poorly organized. Randall and Svåsand (2002) argue that a party’s success in 
creating a value-system is important for party cohesion. Thus, to what extent are the 
members of the PRD committed to the party? In 2003 Semo claimed that the PRD had 
officially the support of two million of the affiliates, but their function was limited to 
participation in the external and internal elections (2003: 125). The members of the PRD 
are more committed to the currents than to the party. There are also examples of the front 
liners who left the PRD, like Muñoz Ledo or Rincón Gallardo, due to their political 
ambitions or lack of confidence in the party.  
 
The Argentinian PJ was infused by value thanks to Peron or Peronism. In the PRD 
Cárdenas played the crucial role. Identification with the leader has two interrelated 
dimensions. Cárdenas is on the one hand perceived as a democratic fighter; on the other 
hand his principals are associated with the presidency of his father, Lázaro Cárdenas, 
who is the most popular president in the Mexican history. Hence, the ideology, which 
influenced the PRD, is called neo-cardenismo. Neo-cardenismo is a mixture of Mexican 
nationalism and socialism, which had the clearest stances in terms of economic policies. 
It represents anti-neoliberal stance. The battle over the privatisation of PEMEX is a good 
example. It is worth noting that the oil industry was nationalised by Lázaro Cárdenas. 
Thus there is a historical tradition, which derives from the post revolutionary era. 
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However, neo-cardenismo has ended with a shift in leadership. Since 2003, the party has 
been infused by obradorismo, which is reminiscent of populist politics. Grayson calls this 
way of making politics ‘messianic’, which “refers to a person whose political vision and 
trajectory combine leftist, populist, nationalist, and corporatists elements in a way that 
separates him from other politicians” (2007: 3). Nevertheless, it is much too early to 
assert whether or not López Obrador infused the PRD with value, or whether this phase is 
just a temporary fixation.  
 
The final element of the Randall and Svåsand framework is reification, or the extent to 
which the party identity and image is embedded in the popular imagination. The PRD is 
one of the biggest parties in Mexico. Thus it is recognizable. The name of the party 
derives from its origins of struggle against hegemonic party rule. The democratic 
revolution can be understood as the transition from this hegemonic system. The PRD is 
often called the party of the Aztec Sun, which is its symbol. Yellow became the colour of 
the party. Hence, during the rallies the plazas are filled with the people wearing yellow 
cloths. These symbols are recognizable. However, nowadays the media has a stranglehold 
on the popular imagination. Regular access to the media is one of the most important 
ways to create and establish a recognisable image of the party. In Mexico, generally 
speaking the media tended to be against the PRD. The party was portrayed as violent or 
corrupted. Noroña states that just one newspaper, La Jornada, and one radio station were 
favourable towards the PRD (2008). Thus, the party built its identity in a very hostile 
environment. At this stage, having examined the main external and internal factors to 
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political development and success, it is possible that the main problem of the PRD could 
be the PRD itself.  
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SYSTEMLESS 
  
The PRD fought for democracy in Mexico hence the name of the party refers to 
democracy. Democracy symbolized liberation from the hegemonic party rule. By 
promoting democracy the PRD cut off also from the notion of communism. In this way 
the democratic left attempted to distinguish itself from the totalitarian inheritance. The 
idea is that while the communist party treated the country in a totalitarian manner, the 
democratic left would do it in a democratic way. However, to be reliable the new left had 
to prove what it meant by democracy and it could be achieved by practicing internal 
democracy. Katz suggests that there are three main reasons why the internal democracy 
matters that much for the new-left. Firstly, internal party democracy allows 
representation of the social segments by legitimizing the dominance of the party on the 
ground over the party in a public office and makes the party manifesto more important 
than individual views. Secondly, the internal democracy encourages members to become 
actively involved in the policy making. Thirdly, internal democracy holds the party 
leaders accountable as well as enforcing control over the party members (Katz 2006: 35-
36).  However, the PRD was established by ex-PRI members and the Mexican leftist 
parties, which did not have an experience of democracy.  Therefore instilling democratic 
values on the party proved extremely difficult.  
 
Due to the fact that the PRD is a broad coalition of different political groupings in 
conjuncture with the belief in democracy, the PRD decided to respect its genetic 
pluralism.  Therefore, in the I National Congress of the party in 1990 the right of the 
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affiliates to organize in the currents was recognized. The notion of the current is to secure 
the free expression for different groups (PRD 1991: 166). These groups have evolved into 
significant power structures In 2004 there were for example: Forum New Sun (FNS a.k.a. 
Amalias), New Left (NI a.k.a. Chuchos), National Democratic Left (IDN a.k.a. 
Bejaranos), the Civic Movement of the Libertarian Left (MCIL a.k.a. Civicos), National 
Unity and Renovation (UnyR) amongst others. Each of them represented a different 
political project within the same party, which resulted in permanent conflict and lack of 
consolidation.  
 
Vivero describes the trajectory of the term current in the Basic Documents of the PRD. 
He suggests that substituting the word current with the word organization in the statute in 
2001/2002 might have been a consequence of negative connotation of the currents 
(Vivero 2005: 134). He states that the intention was to present the party as a more 
consolidated entity.  The currents evolved into internal organizations, whereas the PRD, 
for the first time in its history identified itself as the democratic party of the left (PRD 
2002: 1).  In the VIII Congress in 2004 the currents were theoretically dissolved. In 
reality, however, they are still one of the predominant features of the PRD.  
 
Every party in the world has factions. The uniqueness of the PRD relies on the fact that it 
is the only Mexican party, which recognized the currents. Furthermore, the political 
polarization within the party is so apparent because the party represents extremely polar 
political views associated with the radical Left, social democracy and Mexican 
nationalism.  Thus, the stability of the internal life is related to the balance of forces 
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between the currents and the leader.  The constellations are changing dynamically; one 
time enemies become allies and vice versa. The tension grows as internal or external 
elections get closer.  At this time the press usually announces the possible rupture, split or 
the demise of the PRD.   
 
In 1996 the PRD experimented for the first time with the democratic national internal 
election to the National Executive Committee (CEN).  At the beginning of the race there 
were four candidates for the presidential seat of the PRD: López Obrador, Amalia García, 
Heberto Castillo and Jesus Ortega (whom decided to resign and support López Obrador). 
Proceso López Obrador, a former PRI member, built his campaign around the idea of the 
party in movement and activation of society (Proceso 22 Jan 1996: 29). This project 
assumed that the PRD should become a movement in the period between elections, while 
function as a party during the elections (Proceso 22 Sep 1996: 19 - 21).  Amalia García, 
who joined the party from PCM, highlighted the weaknesses of democracy and the need 
to build a centre-left party (Proceso 22 Jan 1996: 25).  Heberto Castillo, one of the 
leading left-wing politicians in Mexican history, founder of the PMS and the man who 
allowed Cárdenas to compete in 1988 elections, criticized caudillismo and hence 
promoted further democratisation of internal life and institutionalisation of the party.  He 
wanted the PRD to become a broader project because the left-wing attracted 10% of the 
society (Proceso 03 June 1996: 38).  
 
Immediately before the internal election Muñoz Ledo began an historical argument with 
Cárdenas related to the presidential election 1988.  He stated that Cárdenas tried to meet 
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with Salinas after the contest (Proceso 30 June 1996: 14).  Cárdenas did not only refute 
this but he questioned the intentions of this announcement.  He asked whether Muñoz 
Ledo wanted to break away from him or whether he attempted to deepen the differences 
or disturb the process of the internal elections (Proceso 30 June 1996: 15). The two main 
candidates to the presidential seat, García and Lopez Obrador, distanced themselves from 
the conflict between the leaders (Proceso 07 July 1996: 22).  However, both of the 
contenders were endorsed by one leader or the other – García by Muñoz Ledo and López 
Obrador by Cárdenas.  It was not first time, that both Cárdenas and Muñoz Ledo had 
disagreed, however, previous spats concerned political tactics; whether the party should 
struggle or rather should evolve in a constructive opposition and push for pacted-
transition. 
 
López Obrador won 76% of the votes (Proceso 21 July 1996: 17) and the result was 
quickly accepted by counter-candidates. Nevertheless, Castillo accepted the outcome and 
did not hide his disappointment.  He suggested that such a high number of the votes for 
one candidate were suspicious (Proceso 21 July 1996: 35-36).  Furthermore, the outcome 
from the López Obrador home state, Tabasco, where he won 98% of the votes was a 
striking example. Semo, conversely was sceptical about quality of the choice. He stated 
that 66% of the votes in the internal elections came from four Mexican states: Tabasco 
(28%), Michoácan (18%), Mexico (12%) and Federal District (8%) (Proceso 21 July 
1996: 35-36). A huge advantage for López Obrador facilitated the development of the 
PRD (Martinéz 2005b: 162). 
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Additionally, the skills of López Obrador aided to build internal consensus within the 
party. There were three main incentives behind this temporary institutionalisation of the 
chaos within the PRD.  These were: i. proportional distribution of the power between 
internal groupings, ii. new financial resources associated with the public funding, iii. 
separation of the party from Cárdenas for the 1997 election (Martinéz 2005: 78).  This 
consolidation of the party before the election was one of the factors for the triumph in 
1997.  The victory of the PRD in the election also eased the conflict between the leaders.  
Cárdenas became the mayor of Mexico City, whereas, Muñoz Ledo became the first 
member of the opposition party to preside the Chamber of Deputies.  
 
The success in federal election in 1997 changed the PRD political position. Thus in 1998 
in IV National Congress (which according to the statutes is the most important organ of 
the party) the Basic Documents were changed.  The PRD defined itself as a leftist party, 
which recognized the elections as the only access to power. The Congress was a 
breakthrough in the PRD history.  The delegates decided to decrease the number of the 
external candidates from 50% to 20% and the CEN’s proposition was to limit it to 30%. 
Borjas writes that the agreements reached in the IV Congress, which were in many areas 
opposed to the proposition of the CEN, demonstrated an important difference in 
comparison to the previous meetings, in which the delegates ratified the resolutions 
negotiated by the currents.  According to her, the delegates in the IV Congress were more 
independent and acted for a better-consolidated party (2004: 235). 
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By the end of 1998 Muñoz Ledo announced his aspiration to become a presidential 
candidate.  He stated correctly that Cárdenas based his potential start in the presidential 
race on the achievements of his governance in Mexico City (Proceso 25 November 1998: 
19-22). Cárdenas at this stage suffered due to the unfortunate appointments in Federal 
District, the lack of a plan to fight corruption and the lack of a vision and coordination 
regarding public security (Proceso 13 August 1998 28-31). Nevertheless, he did not 
relinquish his presidential ambitions. The struggle over the nomination signified a new 
conflict between the historical leaders.  Soon 103 of the PRD deputies signed a card in 
support of Cárdenas (Proceso  17 January 1999: 22-24).   
 
In this heated environment the four candidates were preparing to contend for the power in 
the PRD.  They were: García, Ortega, Rosa Albina Garavito and Mario Saucedo. The 
uniqueness of this election derived from the fact that candidates to the presidential seat in 
the CEN were not coming from the PRI. García, who represented the current FNS, 
introduced the political program, which assumed further democratisation of Mexico, with 
the strong accent on the reform of the judicial system and alleviation of poverty.  García 
said that to achieve this aim the PRD had to be better organized at every level on a 
national scale (Voz y Voto March 1999: 5). In her view the party should have been 
developed with respect in terms of pluralism and tolerance.  
 
Ortega, a former member of the PST and the PMS and a leader of the current NI, in 
response to the question of: what made his candidacy different from the others, answered 
that he had the ability to conciliate the extremes (Voz y Voto March 1999: 7).  It meant 
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further consolidation of the party, which would translate into its accountability in national 
politics.  He claimed that the party should move from the oppositional stance to the 
proposition of solutions.  Albina, who similarly to Saucedo represented the social left, 
expressed the need to fulfil the meaning of the party identification proclaimed in the IV 
Congress with the content (Martinez 2005: 81).  Thus creation of the left-wing formation 
was the meaning of her proposition.  Saucedo, the leader of the Civicos opted for the 
recovery of the relationship between the party and the social movements. He stood 
against as he formulated ‘priisation’ of the PRD (Voz y Voto March 1999: 8).  
 
The election was a bitter lesson for the party. García won by less than 1% over Ortega. 
However, there were irregularities in 32% of the ballot-boxes (Proceso  28 March 1999: 
14). The number of the errors determined that the election was void. Cárdenas did not 
like this decision of López Obrador. He was supporting the view that the election should 
have been cleaned but not cancelled (Milenio 7 August 2000: 24).  Thus, the PRD, which 
claimed to fight for democracy deviated the process of the internal democracy and 
negated its principles.  The election demonstrated to the public the corporatist or 
clientelist nature of the relations within the PRD with the practices originated from the 
PRI.   
 
In the second election in 1999 the previous contenders as well as Cárdenas and López 
Obrador supported García.  In this race Muñoz Ledo (who founded in the meantime a 
current called New Republic) supported Ifigenia Martínez.  García obtained 55.18% of 
the vote (Reveles 2004: 52).  The internal struggle continued. Felix Salgado Macedonio, 
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one of the new competitors to the presidency of the CEN called García and Jesús 
Sombrano usurpers (Proceso  15 August 1999: 12-16). He claimed that the fraudulent 
practices had not been eliminated.  The members of the internal opposition were soon 
suspended by the CEN. 
 
Martinez points out two things related to the election in 1999.  On the one hand the 
process showed the weaknesses of the party in terms of channelling the conflict of 
different groups, and thus possibility for standardization of internal life. On the other 
hand this election enforced the power of the left-wing in the PRD landscape (Martinez 
2005: 85).  Reveles adds that in the deteriorated organization the position of Cárdenas 
strengthened (Reveles 2004: 52). The role of Cárdenas was enhanced even earlier thanks 
to victory in Mexico City.  However, the chances to win the presidential race in 2000 
were seriously weakened by the scandalous atmosphere. Muñoz Ledo questioned the 
influence of Cárdenas in making decisions within the party, especially during the internal 
elections.  He claimed that his own position in the party was undermined.  Finally he 
decided to become a candidate of the Authentic Party of the Revolution (PARM).  The 
PRD was providing the negotiations with the PAN regarding possible alliance in 2000 
elections.  In March Cárdenas said that he might support Fox in the presidential contest 
(Proceso  14 March 1999: 18-22). The PRD did not find common ground with the PAN 
hence the scrappy coalition of five parties (PRD, PT, PSN, PAS, CD) emerged under the 
name the Alliance for Mexico. Whereas the PRD designated Cárdenas to run for 
presidency, the internal struggle between various groups over the places on the electoral 
lists began.  To make things even worse García put her daughter on the list.  She was 
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accused for ‘maternalism’ (Proceso  02 April 2000).  This decision was an extreme 
example of nepotism within the party. These elements of internal weakness and 
impoverished reputation combined with the mistaken electoral strategy contributed 
toward the catastrophic result in the 2000 race.  
 
The election in 2000 highlighted new crack in the PRD. López Obrador rejected an offer 
to coordinate the campaign of Cárdenas.  He aspired to the seat of Mayor of Mexico City, 
which was against the wish of the leader (Milenio 7 August 2000: 22). Many members of 
the PRD associated with Cárdenas blamed López Obrador for the third defeat in the 
presidential contest.  There were three factors mentioned: the cancellation of the internal 
election in 1999, refusal to manage the presidential campaign and finally, the lack of 
support during the campaign in Mexico City.  Regarding the latter point López Obrador 
could not base his campaign on weak achievements of Cárdenas.  In the 2000 election the 
PRD reached a critical point. Muñoz Ledo became a candidate of the PARM. Gallardo, 
one of the creators of the PRD, left in 1998 to build left-wing alternative. Cárdenas was 
defeated and his position within the party devaluated.  López Obrador became a mayor of 
Mexico City. The rival party, the PAN won presidency.   
 
The consequence of the disastrous elections was that different groupings within the PRD 
began searching for a scapegoat.  The Cárdenas’ supporters blamed the CEN controlled 
by the dominant currents. The CEN in response blamed Cárdenas, who did not allow the 
participation of the CEN in the campaign by the creation of the parallel independent 
body, which took over control of the process (El Cotidiano July/Aug 2002: 57).  These 
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two opinions divided the PRD in the VI Congress in which the party attempted to reform 
and rearrange itself.  
 
García stated that the party was to reform deeply to successfully respond to the new 
reality of democratic Mexico (Voz y Voto 15 March 2001: 10).  She and Ortega attempted 
to consolidate the party by regulation of the informal leadership of Cárdenas. This 
position was criticized by the growing internal faction built around Rosario Robles, who 
favoured the concept of building a broad front under the leadership of Cárdenas against 
the neo-liberal polices (El Cotidiano Sep/Nov 2002: 60). These contradictory tendencies 
were reflected in the document The Political Line approved by the congress. The PRD 
defined itself as the oppositional party, which would seek the agreements with the 
government of Fox in the areas related to improving democracy (La Jornada 3 June 
2001). Conversely, the PRD announced to foster the alliance of the social and political 
actors against the neo-liberal policies of the Fox administration. The divisions, which 
emerged in the VI Congress, determined the election of the CEN.  
 
The 2002 internal election of the PRD were the third contest for Ortega. His main 
counter-candidate was Robles. Ortega was supported by Chuchos and Amalios. He said 
that the PRD should become a political alternative to the government. In his view it 
meant that the party needed to be united around common principles, constructive and 
have a modern program (Voz y Voto 15 Jan 2002: 8).  He said that the modern parties 
were solid institutions; hence charisma had to be replaced with rules and organization. 
Robles agreed with Ortega that the party could not concentrate in the hands of one person 
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(Voz y Voto 15 Feb 2002: 18).  She denied that Cárdenas supported her candidacy.  She 
claimed that her aspiration was to consolidate inclusive party.  She proposed a party 
ideologically based on leftist nationalism and cardenism, which confronted the 
government (El Cotidiano July/Aug 2000: 65).  
 
Two days after the internal election the results were not announced. The irregularities 
were abundant but smaller than in 1999.  About 20% of the ballot-boxes were not 
installed, which led to the nullification of the elections in the states of Mexico, Publa, 
Veracruz, Michoacan and Tamaulias (El Cotidiano July/Aug 2003: 67).  Finally, after 
two weeks Robles was announced as victorious.  She received 441 724 votes while 
Ortega received 281 005 (El Cotidiano July/Aug 2003: 68). Soon after the announcement 
of the official results the VII Congress was convoked to discuss the internal election.  As 
a direct result the Commission for Legality and Transparency was established to 
investigate irregularities. In the Congress Robles called Cárdenas a compatriot and a 
friend (Forum Sep 2003: 16).  
 
One of the promises of Robles was that the PRD would gain 20% votes in federal 
election.  To reach this objective she used the political marketing tools.  The candidates 
were to be chosen on the basis of their popularity, which was measured by the polls 
prepared by the company Mitofsky.  It meant that many militants of the PRD did not 
have a right to choose their candidate.  The party opened the space for external, often 
controversial candidates.  Robles said that the currents had to sacrifice their quotas for the 
expansion of the party (Forum Sep 2003: 16). In terms of the political preferences Robles 
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also moved closer to López Obrador.  The division between the president of the CEN and 
Cárdenas broadened. The latter one called the objective to win 20% of the votes was 
mediocre (Forum Sep 2003: 16). After the election Robles resigned leaving an enormous 
debt of 409 million pesos (La Jornada 20 March 2005).  In her place the PRD nominated 
Leonel Godoy as an interim president.  
 
At the beginning of the 2004 as preparation to the VIII Congress Godoy introduced the 
document The organizational Line, which stated that the PRD was not organized 
(Enfoque 8 Feb 2004: 12-13). The document claimed that the prestige of the party 
decreased in society and the model of the party was exhausted.  In March confidence in 
the PRD was destroyed by the corruption scandal. Members of the administration of 
López Obrador were recorded receiving bribes from the Argentinean entrepreneur (and 
lover of Robles) Ahumada.  The incriminating evidence was shown in the national 
television.  The PRD sunk into the most serious crisis in its history.  
 
Cárdenas stated that anybody, who was involved in corruptive practices, would not have 
a place in the PRD (Masiosare 14 March 2004).  After three days he added that López 
Obrador was not a part of the corruption cycle.  Cárdenas proposed in the VIII Congress 
to dismiss the members of the CEN; however, Godoy, who was always very close to the 
leader, rejected this proposal (Voz y Voto May 2004: 11).  The will of the leader also 
encountered huge resistance between militants (Masiosare 2 May 2004).  The caudillo 
lost his position.  The crowd was chanting one name: López Obrador.  The congress 
established new rules, which were to guarantee the dissolution of the currents.  
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The scandal reflected on the popularity of López Obrador, nevertheless, according to the 
polls he still was much ahead of other possible candidates. Subsequently, the Mexican 
Congress began to consider the impeachment of López Obrador.  The case related to the 
construction of a public road on private strip of land (New York Times 30 Aug 2004). 
The process of impeachment would eliminate the possibility of the mayor of Mexico City 
to run in the presidential election. In the meantime Cárdenas began to build a broad 
political front to impel him as a presidential candidate of the PRD (Proceso  8 August 
2004: 22).   Simultaneously López Obrador incorporated many controversial former PRI 
members to run his campaign (Proceso  19 Dec 2004: 41-44).  
 
In the 2005 election to the CEN Leonel Cota Montaño competed with Camilo Valenzuela 
Fierro.  The former candidate addressed the problems of corruption and political 
bureaucracy. The latter one stressed the issues of institutional weakness and ideological 
confusion, which lead to loss of credibility (La Jornada Michoacan 22 Feb 2005).  The 
irregularities in the electoral process appeared again. About 15.8 % of the ballot-points 
were not installed.  Cota, who was close to López Obrador, received 76% of the votes. In 
the VIII Congress new president of the CEN confirmed his program.  Finally López 
Obrador was not impeached and could compete in the elections.  Cárdenas declined to 
participate in the internal election. One of the biggest problem for López Obrador was 
that he was a very strong candidate with a very weak party (Voz y Voto May 2004: 9) 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The PRD is the most successful left-wing party in Mexican history. This success is partly 
related to the process of democratisation brought about by reforms of the political system. 
These reforms, especially the public funding of the political parties in turn brought about 
the institutionalisation of the party system. Whilst Mexico was democratizing and 
institutionalizing new political system, the PRD encountered serious problems related to 
redefinition of the party’s politics and successful internal reorganization. The main 
problems were related to the cohesion of the party, its leadership, the policies proposed, 
and increasing the scope of influence.  
 
In the years 1997 – 2006 the PRD won 30% of the votes in a minimum of two electoral 
races in 10 states. It is not enough to win the power in Mexico. Hence, the party 
implemented three main techniques to broaden its scope of influence. First one was the 
mobilization program of the Brigades of the Sun, which allowed the PRD to win the 
elections in the Federal District in 1997 and 2000. Second one was the inclusion of the 
external candidates on the electoral lists of the party. Many of them were the ex-PRI 
members. Third one was the creation of the civil networks in 2005. However, each of 
these strategies had short-term effect. Thus, in the long run building a national 
infrastructure of the party is a better solution.  
 
The creation of the national infrastructure was constrained by three main factors. First 
one is related to the PRI national strength. Second one is related to the finances of the 
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PRD. The losses of the party in the elections in 2000 and 2003 caused the reduction of 
the public funding for the party. The PRD had serious financial problems in these years. 
Third one is related to the internal organization. The PRD has many factions called 
currents and a strong informal leadership. The currents are fighting for the presidency in 
the CEN. Thus, there are two centres of political power within the party – the CEN and 
the leader. The study shows that the PRD wins the elections in case when the CEN is 
dominated by the supporters of the leader. However, lack of the regulations of the 
relationship between the leader and the CEN causes problems, which occurred in the 
elections in 2000 and 2003. All of these can be seen to be symptoms of weak 
institutionalisation. 
 
Weak institutionalisation however, does not mean a total lack of institutionalisation. The 
PRD is an example of a party which is run by informal rules or, as Sartori said, “invisible 
politics”. In such a construction, statutes are not so important. The game behind the 
words indicates a struggle between powerful internal groups. Hence, the struggle is 
permanent. The struggle is ongoing between the currents as was the case of the 1999 and 
2002 internal elections or between the dominant currents and the leader as was the case 
of the 2001 and 2004 National Congress. These internal problems could have been 
channeled in a formal way to build a cohesive party.  
 
However, now the PRD has its new chance. López Obrador is wild card for the PRD. He 
has many enemies within the party. His postulate not to legitimize the 2006 elections 
renewed the old debate within the party: whether to act as constructive opposition or 
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struggle for further democratisation. The question emerges whether the lack of 
recognition of the president of the Republic entails lack of the recognition of the PRD 
local governments, which are part of the Mexican government. In 2008 the internal 
election in the PRD ended in fiasco and severe crisis hit the party again.  
 
Therefore, the postulates to normalize the internal life of the party and prepare an 
attractive set of policies seems to be rational. Especially bearing in mind the peculiarity 
of the Mexican political system, which is a presidential system with three main parties, 
where the PRD, apart from winning the presidency, would also have to gain more than 
50% in the Chamber of Deputies in order to gain the authority to actually govern the 
country. Thus, there are three options for the PRD: the first one is to foster a more 
conciliatory stance in regard to other political actors, the second one is to institutionalize 
the party, and the third is to build populist movement around the figure of López 
Obrador. Otherwise it seems almost impossible that Mexico could really be governed by 
the Left. 
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